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DEVELOPING COUNTRY BORROWING AND DOMESTIC WEALTH
ABSTRA
We show that across developing countries, external debt to private
creditors rises more than proportionately with income. We then develop a
simple theoretical model consistent with this phenomenon and also consistent
with the well-documented relationship between capital market development and
growth. Our framework stresses information asymmetries at the level of
individual borrowers as the source of frictions in world capital markets.
Because of moral hazard problems, marginal products of capital and
borrowing—lending spreads are higher in poorer countries. In a two—country
version of the model, we demonstrate the possibility of a siphoning effect
which exacerbates the costs of transfers. Also because of the siphoning
effect, increased wealth in the rich country can stunt investment in the poor
country.
Mark Gertler Kenneth Rogoff
Economics Department Economics Department
University of Wisconsin University of Wisconsin
Madison, WI 53706 Madison, WI 53706I. Introduction
Thestandard neoclassical model of trade and growth predicts that
rich—country savers will lend to investors in high—marginal—product—of—capital
poor countries. After the deregulation of international capital marketsin
the19608, the 1970s indeed witnessed a broad expansion of lending from
industrialized countries to the developing world. However, for certain
featuresof the data, the standard model does notseemto provide the simplest
explanation. For example, during the 1970s middle income' developing
countries were able to borrow more percapitathan poorer countries. Using
data from 1980 for a cross-section of seventy countries, we show that for each
percentage point increase in per capita income, per capita external debt to
private creditors tends to rise significantlymore thanone percent.
Moreover,this relation betweenexternal debt and national income tends to
holdacross countrieswithin the sameregion (Africa, Asia, andLatin
America).
Our ala is to provide a natural explanation of this evidence which is
also consistent with the well—documented positive relationship between capital
market development and growth (Goldsmith (1969) and Mckinnon (1973)1. The
framework here stresses asymmetric information at the level of individual
borrowers as a source of (endogenously—derived) frictions in world capital
markets.1 A positive relation between external borrowing and the state of
development can emerge because in wealthier countries firms are better
capitalized. Informational problems consequently have less impact, resulting
1Our analysis draws on recent developments in the closed—economy literature on
interactions between the real and financial sectors; see Gertler (1988) for a
survey. To abstract from sovereign risk, we assume that there is a
supranational legal authority, capable of enforcing contracts across borders.
Hence our analysis is really as much a model of capital flows between
Manhattan and the Bronx as between Japan and India.
1in a lower cost difference between internal (to a firm) finance and external
finance.
Thus even in a world of perfectly integrated capital markets, In which
riskiess rates are equalized, marginal products of capital can differ across
nations. An Important empirical Implication Is that the spread between
borrowing and lending rates should be larger in poorer countries, which most
development economists take as a stylized fact.
Section II of the paper presents some simple correlations between
national income and borrowing. A small-country model Is presented in section
ru and a two—country general equilibrium version is given in section IV.The
two—countrymodelyIeldsan interesting new perspective on the classic
transfer problem: The cost to a country of repaying a debt may exceed the face
value of the debt, since the decline in wealth exacerbates the
information—induced loan market inefficiencies. Also, a rise In capital
market efficiency In the rich country can lead to a 'siphoning' of Investment
funds from the poor country. In the conclusions, we discuss some possible
alternative explanations for the positive relation between capital Inflows and
domestic wealth.
II. External Debt and GNP for Developing Countries
In Table 1, we present 1980 data on income and external borrowing for
seventy developing countries, listed In order of GNP per capita The second
column lists external debts owed to private lenders; the third column also
includes debts owed to other governments and to multilateral credit agencies
(e.g., the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank). A casual
comparison of column one with either column two or three indicates a strong
correlation between GNP and external borrowing. Table 2 contains two sets of
2TABLE 1
Measures of External Borrowing Versus GYP: 1980
DOLLARSPER CAPITA
ExternalDebt Total
GYP to Private LendersExternal Debt
Ethiopia 107 3 21
Uganda 131 16 56
Nepal 142 0 15
Bangladesh 144 3 45
Chad 162 14 49
Burma 171 9 45
Malawi 190 51 136
Burundi 222 5 40
Rwanda 226 6 37
Mali 231 8 101
Burkina Faso 234 9 54
India 256 3 29
Sri Lanka 271 25 125
Tanzania 276 46 138
Pakistan 283 16 120
Haiti 289 7 60
Sierra Leone 321 51 131
Benin 331 69 120
Cen. Mr. Rep. 343 30 82
Sudan 358 78 268
Somalia 361 13 191
Madagascar 370 68 144
Zaire 380 71 183
Ghana 384 24 114
Kenya 412 117 210
Mauritania 412 122 511
Togo 435 208 408
Niger 471 111 163
Lesotho 481 14 53
Senegal 504 106 225
Yemen A.R. 508 17 165
Indonesia 511 78 143
Egypt 514 149 470
Bolivia 516 263 482
Liberia 591 131 383
Zambia 617 226 558
Honduras 648 201 400
Thailand 686 124 178
Philippines 729 284 360
El Salvador 780 87 202
Cameroon 803 150 296
Papua New GuS. 831 169 243
Morocco 859 240 483
Botswana 1028 11 190
Congo 1036 663 1096-
TABLE1 (Continued)
DominicanRep. 1096 212 368
Jordan 1122 259 601
Guatemala 1128 91 168
Peru 1139 373 578
Jamaica 1157 318 885
Cote D'Ivoire 1206 557 703
Nigeria 1236 98 110
Turkey 1256 190 428
Columbia 1285 176 268
Tunisia 1332 243 554
Ecuador 1373 577 739
Paraguay 1467 174 304
Syria 1518 111 315
Korea 1584 414 773
Panama 1754 1235 1565
Brazil 1912 525 582
Argentina 1987 894 962
Costa Rica 2044 846 1216
Algeria 2203 851 1001
Chile 2391 951 1084
Portugal 2431 750 982
Mexico 2726 763 828
Uruguay 3448 235 570
Gabon 3584 1108 1462
Venezuala 3961 1929 1963
Sources:World Bank, WorldDebtTables: External Debt of Developing Countries,
Vol.II, 1988-89 ed., andInternationalMonetary Fund, International
Financial Statistics.
Notes:Total externaldebtincludes publicandpublicly guaranteed long-term
debt,private non—guaranteedlong-term debt, IMF credit, and short-term
debt.External debt to private lenders includes long-term public
and publicly guaranteed debt to private creditors, long-term private
non-guaranteed debt, and short-term debt. All ofthe World Banks
list of developing countries are includedabove,except those with
1986 populations under one million and/or GNP per capita over $3,000.
Covsnunist countries are also excluded; Shutan, Lebanon)Guinea, Zimbawe
Malaysia are excluded due to insufficient data.TABLE 2
OLS Rresslonsof Debt/CanltaonGNP/CaDIta for Deve1oDin CountrIes: 1980
logTotal External Constant logGNP # Observations
Debt per Capita per Capita
All countries -1.29 1.05 68 .73
(.08)
Sub-Saharan -1.40 1.08 30 .60
Africa (.16)
Latin America -.78 .97 19 .56
andCaribbean (.21)
-2.36 1.20 10 .83
(.19)
log Exset'nal Debt Constant log GNP # Obser.'alions
to Private Lenders per Capita
per Capita
All Countries -5.84 1.60 68 .73
(.12)
Sub-Saharan -5.20 1.51 30 .55
Africa (.25)
Latin America -5.16 1.51 19 .62
andCaribbean (.29)
Asia -9.77 2.22 10 .87
(30)
Africa: Benin,Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, CentralAfrican RepublicChad, Congo,
CoteD'Ivoire, Ethiopia,Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania,
Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, T2n,2ni,Togo,Uganda, Zaire,
Zambia.
Latin America and the Caribbean: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela.
Asia: Bangladesh, Burma, India, Indonesia, Korea, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines,
SriLanka, Thailand.
Other Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Portugal, Syna, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen Arab Republic.regressions, both using the log of GNP per capita as the explanatory variable.
In the first, the dependent variable is the log of total external debt per
capita. Over the entire sample 2, the coefficient on GNP was 1.05, with a
standard error of .08. Separate regressions for Asia, Africa, and
Latin America yield similar results.
One problem with using total external debt to measure country borrowing
is that the component consisting of official (public) debt is probably best
viewed as foreign aid. Whereas most official debt is senior in principle, it
is junior to private debt in practice. Though technically, developing-country
debtors have promptly repaid official debt, in most cases official creditors
have made new loans in excess of any principal and Interest repayments due.
[See Bulow and Rogoff (1988)].
In the second set of regressions reported in Table 2, the dependent
variable Includes only external debt owed to private creditors. Note that the
coefficients are always larger than one and the difference Is significant over
the full sample.3 Again, this simple relation explains a very large share of
the variation In external borrowing across countries, and the coefficients are
relatively stable across regimes.4
2Nepal, which had zero private debt per capita, had to be excluded when the
regressions were run in logs. Because It is poor, Nepal's exclusion biases
the estimated coefficients downwards.
3The results are quite robust to excluding trade credits and/or short term
debt from the regressions. However, when "Micronesian" countries with
populations under one million are included, the coefficients become smaller
and the standard errors larger.
4We also ran a regression that included the growth rate of per capita GNF from
1980 to 1986 as a proxy for expected productivity change. The variable,
however, was unimportant. One can also Interpret the regional regressions as
a crude attempt to control for differences in expected productivity across
countries —theidea being that, while technology may differ between Brazil
and Nigeria, it is less likely to significantly differ between Brazil and
Argentina. Obviously, it would be desirable to explore the dynamics of the
3We chose the year 1980 because after the debt crisis began In 1982, the
correspondence between bookvalueand the market value of loans becomes much
weaker.5 There did not exist a secondary market for bank loans as of 1980,
but most of the private loans were indexed to short—term interest rates. Thus
any capital gains or losses would mainly have to involve sovereign risk. The
fact that most debtor nations were still receiving new funds in 1980 suggests
that expectations of default were still quite low. Almost all sovereign debt
to private creditors is of equal priority (for a rationale see Bulow and
Rogoff (1988)), so countries can generally only get new loans only if their
old loans are valued near par.6
III. A Siill-Country Model withAgencyCoats of Investment
Our goal throughout is to provide the simplest possible model capable of
illustrating our main points. Before turning to the two-country case, we
first develop and analyze a small country framework. We consider an open
economy inhabited by a large number of identical individuals; the economy is
small in the sense that It cannot affect the world Interest rate. There are
two periods and one good. The representative individual Is risk neutral and
cares only about consuming in period two:
U(c)c, (1)
external debt—GNP relation more fully, but unfortunately short—term debt
data for years prior to 1980 is suspect.
5However, the appendix presents similar regressions for the 1986 data, with
similar results.
6Our results do not include direct investment, since including this would not
bein the spirit of the asymmetric information model of section III. However,
we note that for within Africa and Asia, direct investment was small relative
to debt. For South America, it was somewhat larger, though still small
relative to debt.
4where c is her second-period consumption.
Entering periodone,each person is endowed with W units of the
consumption good.7 There exist two ways to convert this endowment into final
period consumption. The first option is to lend abroad at the (gross) world
riskiess interest rate r; the alternative is to Invest in a risky technology.
In particular, each person in the country has a project. All projects are
identical cx ante, and yield cx post returns as follows: k units invested in
period one yield 9 units of second-period output with probability i(k), and
zero units with probability I —s(k).That is,
(9with probability n(k)
1—ir(k)
where y is second—period output. The function i(')isincreasing, strictly
concave and twice continuously differentiable, with w(O) 0, it(m)= 1,and
r/9 <r'(O)< Thus,investment raises the probability that the
individual's project will yield a high level of output, and the marginal
expected return to investment is diminishing.9 We assume that output
realizations are independent across the projects of different individuals.
If an individual wants to invest more than her endowment in her project,
can include any future income which is collateralizable. The distinction
between current and future endowment is not important here. It is important in
the two—country case since the world equilibrium will depend on the total
supply of current endowment; see below.
8(o) >neis needed to guarantee that it is optimal to invest under perfect
information.It is not essential that '(0) be finite, but introducing this
restriction makes the exposition a bit simpler.
91t is easy to generalize the results to a technology with a large set of
possible output realizations. We choose the two—point distribution for ease
of exposition.
5then she must raise funds from the world capital market; that is,
W+bmk (3)
where bisthe amountsheborrows. In return for this amount, she issues a
state—contingent security which pays 2ginthe event the project yields the
good outcome, and in the event of the bad outcome. The security must offer
10
lenders the market rate of return r, so that
+[1—,(k)lZbrb (4)
The left—hand side of (4) is the expected payment to lenders.
The individual's expected second period consumption is given by
E{c} =t(k)fe— — (1—iz(k)lZb+rfW+b—kI (5)
where the last term is the individual's return from risk—free investments
abroad, and the first two terms represent the expected net return on her
project.
The information structure is as follows: Lenders may observe a borrower's
initial wealth and the total amount she borrows. What the borrower does with
the funds, however, is her private knowledge. In particular, she may secretly
lend abroad rather than invest in her project. Whereas investment is
unobservable, lenders can freely observe realized output. The production
function n() is common knowledge.
If there were no information asymmetries, the individual would invest to
the point where the expected marginal project return equals the world interest
rate. Let k denote this first—best level of investment; thus
1°It is not necessary to assume that lenders are risk neutral, but only that
idiosyncratic project risk be diversifiable in world capital markets.
6r (6)
Under asymmetric information, however, it is not generally possible to
implement the first best allocation because the borrower's choice of
investment kisnot verifiable. Contracts canbe conditionedonly on
realized output y, and not on k. Given any output—contingent payoffs (z,z
specified by the contract, the borrower will pick k to maximize her expected
consumption, given by (5). Thus she will equate her expected marginal gain
from investing with her opportunity cost of (secretly) holding assets abroad12
— —zbn=r (7)
So long as Z9 differs from Zb, k will differ from its first—best optimum
value k", given by (6).The problem is that the borrower's marginal benefit
from investing depends not only on the marginal gain in expected output, but
on the change in her expected obligation to lenders, as well. We will
subsequently refer to (7) as the "incentive constraint."
If the borrower could promise lenders a fixed payment =r(k"-W)
then (by (7)] she would invest the first best amount k. This is not
feasible, however, since the project yields nothing in the bad state. Since
the borrower's consumption must be non—negative, an important constraint on
the form of the contract is
b
2 O (8)
The incentive problem emerging here is classified as moral hazard because the
informational asymmetry arises after contracting. See Dixit (1987) for an
application to international trade.
12The analysis would be qualitatively similar if the borrower had the option of
secretly consuming in period one instead of secretly lending abroad.
7For the case where V <kthe optimal incentive compatible contract Is
found by choosing Zb.b,andk to maximize (5) subject to (3)(4) (7)
and(8).The solution is as follows13: The contract pays lenders zero in the
bad state, so that (8) is binding.(More generally, the contract always pays
lenders the maximum feasible amount in the bad state.) This serves to
minimize the spread between Z5 and Zb, thereby minimizing the difference
between the borrower's decision rule for k (eq. (7)1andthe socially
efficient rule (eq. (6)1.14 Similarly, equation (3) is binding; 4 +b k.
Thus, inequilibrium,the borrower does not secretly lend abroad. Borrowing
more than is essential to finance k would raise the gap between and2b•
Since(3) and (5) hold with equality for the information—constrained
case, one can use these equations to eliminate band2bfrom(4) and (7). The
result is the following two equations, which determine k and
— — r, IC curve (9)
2g— r(k-W)/(k) MRcwve (10)
Equation(9) is the incentive constraint, and is drawn as the curve IC In
Figure 1.It is downward sloping. A rise in Z5 lowers the borrower's
expected marginal gain from investing and therefore must be offset by a
decline in k. The curve Intersects the vertical axis at a value of Z9 which
lies between zero and e (recall that ne <r'(0)<m).Itintersects the
horizontal axis at k since eq. (9) resembles eq. (6) when Z9 equals zero.
Equation (10) is the constraint that lenders must receive the market rate of
13See the Appendix for details.
14The idea that Informational asymmetries can affect an individual firm's
Investment strategies and financial structure originated with Jensen and
Heckling (1976).
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return, and is labeled as the MR curve.It is upward sloping. When k rises,
borrowing goes up; this means must rise since cannot adjust. The curve
intersects the horizontal axis at k equal to W. It lies above the horizontal
. .
axisat k since k >W.
Investment in the information—constrained case must be below its first
.
bestvalue k .Theresult that k <kfollows immediately from a comparison
of (6) and (9), as well as from inspection of Figure 1.If k Is below k,
then cx post per capita output, ex(k), must lie below its first best value,
An implication is that both per capita investment and per capita
output will depend on per capita wealth. A rise in W shifts the MR curve
downward in Figure 1 and leaves the IC curve unchanged, thereby raising k and
lowering Z5.17 Additional wealth increases the amount of internal funds
available to the borrower; so for a given level of investment, declines.
mitigating the Incentive problem. Investment rises, in accordance with
eq.(9). thus raising output as well.18
Now consider the link between external borrowing and country wealth.
15The slope of the MR curve equals [r/t(k)1[1 —Ø(k)(1—W/k)];where 0(k) is
the ratio of the marginal product of capital to the average product, given
by ir'(k)/(ir(k)/k). Since 0 <0(k)<1and since W <kalong the MR curve, the
slope must be positive.
16Because the productivity risks are Independent across investment projects,
and because the number of projects Is large, there is no aggregate risk.
17The result that increases in borrower net worth stimulate Investment when
Informational problems are present is quite general; see Bernanke and Gertler
(1989). For some empirical support, see Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988).
18The effect of a change in W on k is given by
=ir'(k)Z/L(ir"(k)/ir'(k))r
—'(k)ZJ)0
where Z(r,k,W)r(k —W)/z(k),so that Z >0and <0.
9Let x denote per capita borrowing from abroad, equal in this case to k —W.






0 < •(k) —ir'(k)/(ir(k)/k]<1
External borrowing will rise with W if a dollar increase in wealth induces
more than a dollar increase in investment. This will be the case if
diminishing returns set in slowly, i.e., ir(k) is small relative to ir'(k).
(Inspection of eq. (ii) indicates that the magnitude of varies inversely
with the absolute value of i(k)/i' (k). ) Thus, to the extent that per capita
GNP can be considered a proxy for per-capita wealth, the framework is capable
of explaining the positive relation between external borrowing and output for
developing countries, documented in section II. The informational problem is
of course key to the result; when the incentive constraint is not binding,
external borrowing simply declines a dollar for each dollar increase in
wealth; this occurs since investment is no longer influenced by changes in W.
A corresponding result is that the spread between the marginal product of
capital and the world riskless interest rate will vary across countries, and
will in particular be larger the poorer the country. Note that cross-country
differences in marginal products of capital may arise here even though the
world capital market is perfectly integrated (the riskiess rate is the same
19
everywhere).
Finally, consider how changes in the world interest rate influence
19Thus our model is completely consistent with Frankel and MacArthur's (1988)
finding that covered interest differentials are relatively small for many
LDCs.
10investment. As r goes up, the IC curve shifts to the left. The borrower's
opportunity cost of Investing rises, so for any given value of Z9, k must
decline. The MR curve moves inward as well. Some combination of a rise in
2ganda fall in k is necessary for lenders to continue to receive a
competitive return. The interest-elasticity of investment in the
information—constrained case may or may not be greater than in the full
information case. It is greater if > 0.This will likely be the case
if the initial amount borrowed, k —W,is large or if the production function
is sufficiently concave so that the decline in k is not enough to offset the
20
higher rate of interest.
None of the countries listed in Table 1 represents more than a tiny
fraction of the world's GNP. However, taken together, they are economically
larger than Japan. Therefore, for some issues involving multi-lateral
transfers of wealth (e.g., due to a global restructuring of Third World debt).
it is of interest to analyze the general equilibrium implications of these
nations' capital market activities.
IV.The Two-Country General Equilibrii Case
Supposethereare two countries of equal population size, country R
("rich") and country P ('poor"). In each country, a percent of the
individuals are "entrepreneurs" and 1—u percent are "lenders." All
individuals have the same utility function, given by equatIon (1). That is,




where 25(r,k) =r(k—W)/ir(k),so that Z >0and <0.
iithey are risk neutral and care only about second period consumption. Entering
the first period, all entrepreneurs in the poor country are endowedwith
units of the good, and all lenders are endowed with units.Similarly,
entrepreneurs and lenders in the rich country are endowed with and
units, respectively. For the time being,theonly restriction we need impose
is titatw'<WR.
Each entrepreneur owns and manages a risky investment project. The
project technology is the same across entrepreneurs and across countries, and
is given by equation (2) above. As before, if an entrepreneur wants to Invest
more than her endowment she has to borrow, so that equation (3) still applies.
Lenders do not have projects; their only option is to lend to entrepreneurs.
21
The information structure is the same as in the small country case.
Lenders observe a project's realized output, but cannot observe the capital
input. They cannot directly see whether the entrepreneur is secretly lending
to other entrepreneurs.
If there were no information asymmetries, the following three equations
would characterize the world equilibrium:
=r (12)
=r (13)
+k) = (W1'+Wm)+(1)(%fL+W) (14)
wherethe P and R superscripts denote the countries, and the •'s denote the
lenders, entrepreneurs would not be borrowers in the world general
equilibrium.
22Note that entrepreneurs may secretly rechannel their investment funds either
directly,or through a (zero—profit) intermediary.
12full Information equilibrium. The main difference from the small country case
is of course that the world Interest rate r is endogenous. It depends on
technology and the total world endowment. Since the technologies are the
P.
same,k equals k .Underperfect information, the pattern of investments
Is independent of the pattern of endowments.






+ k) a(W + WR) + (l—)(W"+WJe)WV curve
Equations (15) and (16) correspond to equation (9)for the small country
case,and equations (17) and (18) correspond to equation (10). Equation (19)
is the condition that the total demand for investment capital must equal the
world supply, and is drawn as the negatively—sloped WV curve in Figure 2.
Investment In the poor country is now less than in the rich country.
Combining equations (15) through (18) yields
r p(k",W")G —p(kR,WR)e pp curve (20
where the function p('') is given by
ic'(ks)
p(k,W') = , JP,R
1 + ic'(k)[k—Wl/ir(k)
AsIndicated In equation (20),p1 <0 andp2> 0.Itfollows Immediately tha
13Figure 2
EQUILIBRIUMINTHE 1110 COUNTRY CASE
vvk <kR,since WP <WR.Because Investment is distorted, world output is
lower than in the perfect information case. The world interest rate must al
be lower; this is easily demonstrated by comparing conditions (16) and (13),
and noting that kR >kR.and that >0.Thus lenders must be worse off
under asymmetric information. Equation (20) is drawn as the positively—slop
pp curve in FIgure 2.
In general, the pattern of world investment depends on the agency costs
of lending In one country relative to the other, which In turn depends on th
net asset positions of entrepreneurs across countries.23 To illustrate this
point, suppose that the wealth of rich country entrepreneurs Improves, but
that both total world endowment and the endowments of poor country
entrepreneurs remain unchanged. Consider, for example, a redistribution of
wealth In the rich country from lenders to entrepreneurs. This corresponds
an upward rotation In the pp curve in Figure 2; the WV curve remains
unchanged. kR rises and k falls. The decline in the agency costs of finan
in the rich country induces a "siphoning" of investment funds from the poor
country.24Theincreased demand for funds by rich country entrepreneurs driv
up the world interest rate, drawing capital out of the poor country.
[Inspection of eq. (20) IndIcates that r/8W5 >0since k declines and
unchanged. IEntrepreneursin the poor country lose rents as a result of the
23An important difference between our modelandearlier frameworks emphasizin,
capital market frictions (e.g., Persson and Svenson (1987)) is that the
Imperfections and the forms of the financial contracts are derived
endogenously. An important exception Is Greenwood and Williamson
(forthcoming) who develop a monetary modelofInternational business
fluctuations under Incomplete Information. Another related paper is Samolyk
(1988), who studies the transmission of regional disturbances in financial
markets.
24Seethe appendix for an analytical derivation.
14capital flight. This loss of rents Is aggravated by the rise in the world
interest rate. Lenders In the poor country benefit from the rise in interest
rates but as long as the poor country Is a net borrower, its national income
must fall.
A fall in the wealth of poor country entrepreneurs similarly induces
siphoning of capital from the poor to the rich country. The reduced
efficiency of lending in the poor country causes funds to flow out to the
world capital market.In contrast to the previous case, the world interest
rate declines.(Inspection of eq. (20) indicates that är/8W1' <0since k5
increases while remains unchanged.] The shift of investment funds from the
high marginal product of capital poor country to the low marginal product of
capital rich country depresses the equilibrium Interest rate.
Now consider a transfer of wealth from the poor country to the rich. In
particular, suppose that_t units of wealth are taken from each citizen of the
poor country and are distributed evenly among the citizens of the rich
country. This transfer can also be graphed as an upward rotation of the pp
curve In Figure 2. However, for a given change In the pp curve shifts by
more than for our earlier example in which the transfer came from rich country
lenders. Both the increase In and the decline In Induce kR to rise and
to fall. The net effect on the world Interest rate is ambiguous; greater
tends to move the Interest rate up while less W' moves It down, as
discussed earlier. Note that under perfect InformatIon a similar transfer of
wealth would affect neither Investment nor the interest rate (see eqs. (12) -
(14)).
The wealth transfer naturally imposes a direct cost on the poor country.
But there may be indirect costs as well. Holding constant the world interest
rate, entrepreneurs in the poor country lose additionally because their
15project rents decline due to the reduction in investment. Thus, to the exter
that the movement in the world interest rate is not large, the indirect
effects always magnify the costs of the transfer. If the change in the
interest rate is large (owing to highly concave production functions) then tt
exact effect on the poor country's national income depends on whether it is
net debtor or creditor in the world capital market. However, if the poor
country is small, the movement in r Is negligible so that the capital market
problems always magnify the costs of wealth transfers.
This model accordingly produces a transfer" problem in the sense that
the cost to a country of paying a foreign debt may exceed the face value of
the payments. Here the transfer problem relates to intertemporal trade rathe
than contemporaneous trade, as in the classic debate between Keynes and Ohlin
It arises because the distribution of wealth affects the allocation of
investment, due to information asymmetries.
As another variation on this theme, consider a shock which increases the
initial endowment of all Individuals in the rich country, thus Increasing the
total supply of Investment funds available to the world capital market.
Under perfect Information, capital investment would rise the same In each
country. But under asymmetric Information, there will be a siphoning effect
since the wealth of rich country entrepreneurs rises as well. Thus the
increase In investment will be greater in the rich country, and It is even
conceivable that investment may decline In the poor country.
Note that In a dynamic context, the relevant measure of a borrower's
wealth, W, includes not only lIquId assets, but any collaterallzable expected
future profits as well.25 Thus good news about future business conditions In
25 See Gertler (1988), who studies a closedeconomy with repeated production
and asymmetrIc information where entrepreneurs enter long—term financial
16the rich country can also induce the slphoning effect described above.
Finally, we consider a shock to world productivity, 8. By inspection of
of equation (20). we see that a world productivity shock has no effect on the
distribution of investment capital, since 8 factors out of both sides. As in
the full Information case, the rise In 8 Increases per capita world output and
the world interest rate r
V.Conclusions
Acrossdeveloping countries, external debt to private creditors rises
more than proportionately with Income. Our simple model of international
finance under asymmetric Information provides one natural explanation of this
phenomenon. There are, however, other plausible theories. Sovereign risk is
clearly an important feature of developing—country borrowing, and modern
bargaining—theoretic analyses of sovereign lending suggest a strong relation
between Income and external debt. In the standard models, the relationship is
26
generally proportional. It would be Interesting to extend the present model
to include both sovereign risk and asymmetrically—informed borrowers and
27
lenders. The Marshall—Romer model of growth under increasing returns to
scale yields a very different rationale for why the Income elasticity of
external borrowing might exceed unity (Romer (1989)]. One testable difference
between the Marshall-Romer model and the one developed here is that our
contracts with lenders.
26See Bulow and Rogoff (1989). or Fernandez and Rosenthal (1988).
27The model of Atkeson (1988) does incorporate both sovereign risk and moral
hazard, though the private information in his model is at the level of the
government and not the individual.
17framework would predict that marginal products of capital are higher in poor
countries. Our framework yields a similar prediction for borrowing and
lending spreads.
It Is important to stress that although there are capital market
Imperfections in the model,governmentIntervention cannot be Pareto
Improving. To achieve Pareto ImprovIng Interventions the public agency would
have to be more efficient than private lenders In overcoming the Informational
problems.
Finally, we note that the present analysis suggests an alternative
explanation for the Feldsteln—Rorioka (1980) puzzle that savings and
Investment tend to be highly correlated across countries.28 In a world of
perfect Information, If a small country's endowment increases without any
corresponding increase in its productive opportunities, It will invest any
increased savings abroad.In a model where borrowing is subject to
Informational problems, however, a large part of the increase in savings may
be invested domestically.
28Feldstein and Horloka appeal to imperfectly integrated world capital markets
to explain their puzzle. Obstfeld (1986), Stulz (1986) and Tesar (1988) show
how the saving—investment correlation could arise in a frictionless setting if
technologyshocks aredominant.
18APPDIX
Theformalproblemwhich jointly determines how much the entrepreneur
invests and her contractual arrangement with lenders is as follows: choose k,
b, andtosolve
max
—2e)—(1—lr(k)lZb+ r(W + b —k)
subject to
+ (1 —l(k)JZb•r
— — 2b)] r (A3)
OaZb (A4)
W+b—kO (A5)
Let M. 1. vand *bethe (non—negative) multipliers associated with (A2)
—(AZ).respectively. Then the first—order necessary conditions with respect
q b





Recall that k Is the first best level of capital Investment, given by
19- r0 (Ala)
(which corresponds to eq. (6) in the text). Then we have:
S . .
Proposition1: Ci)IfW a k ,Ic Ic ;(ii)if W <Ic•Ic<Ic
Proof: Part Ci)Isobvious; since W a Ic' the entrepreneur has
sufficient wealth to undertake the unconstrained optimal investment without
borrowing; she will lend any residual wealth. Part (ii) can be proven by
contradiction. Suppose W <Icmaci Ic a Ic. Then (AS) implies b >0.If b >
0,then (A2) and (A4) imply >Zb.If Z9 >then(A3) and (AlO) imply k <
Ic,whichleads to a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Proposition 2: If W (Ic'.k is given Jointly with 2qby
ic'(Ic)(e —2q) • r (All)
• r(k —W)/i(k) (A12)
where (All) and (A12) correspond to eqs. (9) and (10 )Inthe text.
Proof: If W <thenIc <Ic,from Proposition 1. If k <k'then >
from(A3) and (AlO).It follows from (A6) —(A8)that j> i.This in turn
implies that i v, and iarepositive. Thus (A4) and (AS) hold with equality.





Proof:W <Icimplies k <Ic,fromProposition 1. ProposItion 2 then
Implies 2b0.If k < and =0.then >0from (A3).It follows from
20(A12) thatk > W.Q.E.D.
COMPARATIVESTATICS OF THE TWO-COUNTRY CASE
Fromeqs. (19) and(20)in the text, and are determined Jointly by
the following two conditions:
p(kR,WR)= p(k,W11) (Bi)
a(kR + k) a(W" + W) + (1—a)(W' + W) (B2)
where
3 a(k)
p(k3,W')• p3 = J—P,a (83)
1 +a'(k3)(k3-W3)/a(k')
sothat p<0andp>0.
Initiallywe assume thatworldwealth is held constant at .l (thinkofthe








Inspection of eq. (20) indicates that >0(since k declines andW' is
unchanged),while—>0(since k declines andisunchanged).
8wP
Nextnote that national income per capita for country J, y3, is given by
21a 4z(lr(k)e—r(k—w')j+(l—)rW,
— (k)e+r((xW + (l_a))W3L) —ak] (B7)
Usingtheprevious results in conjunction with (87), one can readily determin
the impact of changes in andW1' onthe national income of each country.
For example, it is straightforward to show thatarise in may lower the
national income of the poor country, and definitely does so if the poor
country is a net debtor in the world capital market (i.e., if +
(l—))W'i —k'}< 0).
Now suppose the total stock of world endowment Is permitted to change.
For simplicity, let a and W, so that (B2) becomes
RPWR,P (B8)
Then,
(—apR + pP)/a(pR + P > o —(a+
p )/a(p + 4) ? (B9)
Under perfect information. (88) together with eqs. (12) and (13) imply that
8kR 8k —=
R1/2a.Equation (89) indicates that under asymmetric information
>l/2aif is not too much smaller thanor jpRIs sufficiently
fi
1 2
large.29 The term —ap in the numerator of (B9) reflects the Influence of the
siphoning effect. If the siphoning effect is very strong (Rislarge), 2
may be negative.
29Note that p p when =
22TABLE Al
Measuresof ExternalBorrowing Versus GNP: 1986
DOLLARS PER CAPITA
GNP External Debt Total
to Private Lenders External Debt
Ethiopia 116 9 49
Bhutan 132 0 16
Bangladesh 152 3 78
Chad 157 13 46
Nepal 158 3 44
Malawi 162 20 155
Zaire 164 38 220
Mali 183 16 206
Tanzania 199 35 181
Zambia 204 232 815
Burma 206 3 96
Burkina Faso 235 7 99
Madagascar 236 46 285
Burundi 257 10 114
Uganda 275 9 79
Guinea 282 31 249
Niger 285 87 230
India 297 13 54
Rwanda 304 6 70
Sudan 308 142 431
Togo 313 56 349
Kenya 327 69 233
Benin 332 122 226
Pakistan 336 27 149
Lesotho 343 8 119
Cen. Afr. Rep. 344 19 166
Sierra Leone 345 40 165
Sri Lanka 389 61 252
Somalia 395 54 485
Ghana 398 32 189
Mauritania 400 70 934
Zimbabwe 415 190 669
Haiti 415 21 130
Indonesia 429 145 258
Liberia 456 143 633
Nigeria 468 179 248
Senegal 531 88 456
Philippines 543 344 515
Bolivia 590 401 844
Yemen A.R. 619 46 328
Morocco 619 274 830
Egypt 660 233 763
Papua New Gui. 706 525 705
Dominican Rep. 774 194 548
El Salvador 779 58 349
Thailand 786 200 356
Honduras 792 223 662TABLE Al (Continued)
CoteD'Ivoire 852 715 1097
Guatemala 857 142 337
Botswana 874 38 345
Congo 907 1382 2079
Jamaica 918 315 1709
Paraguay 937 204 535
Cameroon 989 168 351
Ecuador 1050 641 956
Turkey 1123 331 652
Tunisia 1129 282 788
Columbia 1155 293 526
Chile 1211 1286 1641
Jordan 1214 596 1179
Peru 1314 480 790
Mexico 1540 1072 1270
Costa Rica 1540 958 1696
Syria 1756 178 416
Brazil 1940 634 814
Uruguay 2000 986 1277
Panama 2159 1462 2213
Portugal 2248 1314 1604
Korea 2288 822 1124
Argentina 2397 1353 1602
Gabon 2569 1009 1374
Venezuala 2723 1903 1951
Algeria 2752 723 857
Sources: World Bank, World Debt Tables: External Debt of Developing
Countries, Vol. II, 1988-89 ed., andInternationalMonetary
Fund,InternationalFinancial Statistics.
Notes: Total external debt includes public andpubliclyguaranteed
long-termdebt, private nonguaranteed long-term debt, IMF
credit,andshort—termdebt.Externaldebt to private lenders
includes long-term publicand publicly-guaranteeddebt to private
creditors, private non—guaranteed long-term debt, and short— term
debt. All of theWorldBank'slistof developing countries are
included above,exceptthose with 1986 populationsunderone
million and1986GNPs over $3,000. Co,mnunist countries are
excluded;LebanonandMalaysia areexcludeddue to insufficient
data.TABLE A2
OL.S Reiresslonsof Debt/Canlta on GNP/CapitaforDevelopins CountrIes: 1986
log TotalExternal Constant log GNP # Obseivatzon,
Debt per Capita per Capita
Allcountries -.68 1.04 73 .67
(.09)
Sub-Saharan -.21 .99 33 .69
Africa (.19)
LatinAmerica -1.10 1.11 19 .58
and Caribbean (23)
Asia -3.09 1.38 12 .82
(.20)
logExternal Debt Constant log GNF # Obse,vations
to Private Lenderr per Capita
per Capita
AllCountries .6.35 1.74 72 .72
(.13)
Sub-Saharan -5.05 1.54 33 .47
Africa (.29)
Latin America -&08 2.00 19 .73
and Caribbean (.29)
Asia -10.90 2.45 11 .83
(36)
Africa:Benin,Botawana, Buridna Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo,
Cole D'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Libena, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali,
Mauritania,Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda,
Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
LatinAmerica and the Caribbean: Argentina,Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica,
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico,
Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Vruguay, Venezuela.
Asia:Bangladesh,Burma, India, Indonesia, Korea, Nepal, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Philippines,
Sri Lanka, Thailand.
OrherAlgeria,Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Portugal. Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Yemen Arab Republic.Ref erencem
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